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I. INTRODUCTION
A standard liability insurance policy provides that the insurer will
pay up to coverage limits all sums that the insured becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages for injuries to a third party caused by an
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"accident" or "occurrence." Policy exclusions expressly limit the in-
surer's promised coverage.1 A standard liability insurance policy fur-
ther obligates the insurer to provide its insured with a defense. Most
policies promise that the insurer will defend "any suit against an in-
sured alleging damage within the scope of the policy even if such suit
is groundless, false, or fraudulent."2 Generally, a policy also reserves
to the insurer the right to settle, and reserves broad control over the
litigation to the company.3 For these reasons, liability insurance is,
essentially, "litigation insurance."4
To protect its insured's rights and interests when suit is filed, the
insurer hires defense counsel from a panel of firms with which the
company regularly deals.5 The result is the creation of a tripartite
relationship between the insurer, the insured, and appointed defense
counsel. "The three parties may be viewed as a loose partnership, coa-
lition or alliance directed toward a common goal, sharing a common
purpose" during the pendency of the litigation.6
1. Michael J. Brady & Heather A. McKee, Ethics in Insurance Defense Context: Isn't
Cumis Counsel Unnecessary?, 58 DEF. CouNs. J. 230, 231 (1991). An insurer dis-
puting coverage bears the ultimate burden of proving that the subject loss re-
sulted from a cause falling within a policy exclusion. First Am. Natl Bank v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co., 5 F.3d 982, 984 (6th Cir. 1993); Chemical Leaman Tank
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1143 (D.N.J. 1993);
American Star Ins. Co. v. Grice, 854 P.2d 622, 625-26 (Wash. 1993).
2. ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 561 (1987). The existence
of a duty to defend initially turns upon those facts known to the insurer at the
inception of the litigation. See Saylin v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 493, 497 (Ct. App. 1986). The duty to defend arises upon tender of the
defense to the insurer. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153,
1157 (Cal. 1993). As a rule, an insurer's duty to defend is continuing, that is, the
insurer's duty continues throughout the course of the litigation against its in-
sured. Lambert v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 737, 739 (Cal.
1991); Home Sav. Ass'n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 854 P.2d 851, 855 (Nev. 1993).
If it becomes clear in the course of the litigation that no coverage exists under any
plausible set of facts, and if the insurer has reserved its rights, or obtained a non-
waiver agreement, the insurer may withdraw its defense provided its withdrawal
will not prejudice the insured's interests. An insurer's reservation of rights and
the possible effects thereof are discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 31-
67. An insurer may also be relieved of its duty to defend by a declaratory judg-
ment. See New Mexico Physicians Mut. Liab. Co. v. LaMure, 860 P.2d 734, 737
(N.M. 1993). This Article does not address insurers' pursuit of declaratory judg-
ment actions.
3. Thomas V. Murray & Diane M. Bringus, Insurance Defense Counsel-Conflicts of
Interest, FED'N INS. & CORP. CouNs. Q. 283, 283 (1991).
4. See International Paper Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 320 N.E.2d 619, 621 (N.Y.
1974).
5. Insurance defense counsel are generally selected based on recognized experience
and skill in the liability categories the insurer writes. See Ronald E. Mallen, A
New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 53 INS. CoUNs. J. 108, 109 (1986).




So long as an insurer's interests are harmonious and aligned with
those of its insured, there is no inconsistency between the company's
duty to defend and its right to control the litigation. But what of the
situation where an insurer defends under a reservation of rights?
What if a defense attorney's activities generate information support-
ing a possible coverage defense? What are the parties' respective obli-
gations when plaintiffs' claimed damages exceed coverage? This
Article examines conflicts of interest arising out of the unique tripar-
tite relationship characterizing insurance defense.7 That examination
necessarily includes a review of the sources of conflicts, and a look at
judicial and legislative actions and reactions. The avoidance and miti-
gation of potential conflicts of interest are also discussed.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
Conflicts of interest flow not from an insurer's duty to indemnify
but, rather, from its duty to defend.8 Insurers owe their insureds a
defense if the allegations of the subject lawsuit are even potentially
within the scope of the policy.9 Generally, whether a defense is owed
may be determined by reviewing the petition or complaint.1o An in-
7. In this context, and as used in this Article, a "[c]onflict of interest between [in-
sured and insurer] occurs whenever their common lawyer's representation of the
one is rendered less effective by reason of his representation of the other." Spin-
dle v. Chubb/Pacific Indem. Group, 152 Cal. Rptr. 776, 780-81 (Ct. App. 1979).
Some courts have defined conflicts of interest more specifically. See, e.g., Cunniff
v. Westfield, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). The Cunniffcourt observed
that, under New York law, a conflict requiring independent counsel arises when
"'the defense attorney's duty to the insured would require that he defeat liability
on any ground and his duty to the insurer would require that he defeat liability
only upon grounds which would render the insurer liable.'" Id. at 57 (quoting
Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 425 N.E.2d 810, 815 n.* (N.Y. 1981)).
8. Sharon K. Hall, Note, Confusion Over Conflicts of Interest: Is There a Bright Line
for Insurance Defense Counsel?, 41 DAKE L. REv. 731, 732 (1992).
9. Enserch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., 952 F.2d 1485, 1492 (5th Cir. 1992)(ap-
plying Texas law); Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037,
1042 (7th Cir. 1987)(applying Illinois law); E.B. & A-C. Whiting Co. v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 838 F. Supp. 863,866-67 (D. Vt. 1993); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sussex County, 831 F. Supp. 1111, 1130 (D. Del. 1993)(applying New Jersey law);
Kootenai County v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 750 P.2d 87, 89 (Idaho 1988); James
Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273,
279 (Ky. 1991); Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Luetmer, 474 N.W.2d 365, 368
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Biborosch v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1050, 1052
(Pa. Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 615 A.2d 1310 (Pa. 1992).
10. See Lime Tree Village Community Club Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,
980 F.2d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir. 1993)(looking at allegations in complaint to deter-
mine duty to defend under Florida law); Selective Ins. Co. v. J.B. Mouton & Sons,
Inc., 954 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 1992)(comparing allegations in complaint with
policy terms to determine duty to defend under Louisiana law); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1990)(applying
North Carolina law); First Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
1994]
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surer must defend a claim against its insured "when any theory of the
complaint gives rise to the possibility that the insurer would be liable
for its costs."13 The petition or complaint must be liberally inter-
preted for purposes of determining whether coverage is excluded.12 If
just one of several pleaded theories potentially triggers coverage, the
insurer is obligated to defend the entire suit, even if other bases for
recovery are specifically excluded under the policy.13
The duty to defend is broad, and in some jurisdictions its determi-
nation may require more than a simple review of pleadings:
[The insurer] must look beyond the effect of the pleadings and consider any
facts brought to its attention or any facts which it could reasonably discover
when determining whether it has a duty to defend .... The possibility of
coverage may be remote, but if it exists the company owes the insured a de-
fense. The possibility of coverage must be determined by a good faith analysis
of all information known to the insured or all information reasonably ascer-
tainable by inquiry and investigation.1 4
Co., 770 F. Supp. 513, 515 (D.N.D. 1991), aff'd, 971 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1992);
Apcon Corp. v. Dana Trucking, Inc., 623 N.E.2d 806, 809 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993),
appeal denied, 631 N.E.2d 705 (111. 1994); Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg.
Co., 461 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Mass. 1984)(observing that duty to defend is decided by
matching complaint with policy provisions); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Paget,
860 P.2d 864, 866 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Capital Bank v. Commonwealth Land Title
Ins. Co., 861 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)(looking at policy language and
allegations of complaint to determine duty to defend); Professional Office Bldgs.,
Inc. v. Royal Indem. Co., 427 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988); First Wyo-
ming Bank, N.A. v. Continental Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Wyo. 1993).
11. Illinois Mun. League Risk Mgt. Ass'n v. Seibert, 585 N.E.2d 1130, 1134 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1992). Cf Gerrity Co. v. CIGNA Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 606, 607
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993)(looking to complaint's factual allegations, and not legal
claims, to determine insurer's duty to defend).
12. In re Complaint of Stone Petroleum Corp., 961 F.2d 90, 91 (5th Cir. 1992).
13. Gregory v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 948 F.2d 203, 205 (5th Cir. 1991)(apply-
ing Louisiana law); Tews Funeral Home Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037,
1042 (1987); Overthrust Constructors, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 676 F. Supp. 1086,
1091 (D. Utah 1987)(applying Utah law); LaJolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v.
Industrial Indem. Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 659 (Ct. App. 1993), cert. granted,
866 P.2d 1311 (Cal. Jan. 27, 1994)(No. S036170)(quoting Devin v. United Servs.
Auto. Ass'n, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 273 (Ct. App. 1992)); Voorhees v. Preferred Mut.
Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1259 (N.J. 1992).
14. Patron's Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Harmon, 732 P.2d 741, 744 (Kan. 1987). See Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dannenfeldt, 778 F. Supp. 484, 499 (D. Ariz. 1991); American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Allied-Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 106, 112 (Ct.
App. 1993)("The existence of a potential for liability is determined from the facts
learned by the insurer, either as pleaded in the complaint or from extrinsic
sources."); Spivey v. Safeco Ins. Co., 865 P.2d 182, 188 (Kan. 1993)("[Aln insurer
must look beyond the effect of the pleadings and must consider any facts brought
to its attention or any facts which it could reasonably discover in determining
whether it has a duty to defend."); SL Indus., Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co.,
607 A.2d 1266, 1272 (N.J. 1992)(stating that facts outside complaint may trigger
duty to defend if known to insurer); Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co.,
575 N.E.2d 90, 93 (N.Y. 1991).
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Any doubts about coverage must be resolved in the insured's favor.15
An insurer that breaches its duty to defend is bound by a settlement
or judgment rendered against its insured.' 6
Because of its financial interest in the effective resolution of a
claim, the insurer has a contractual right to control its insured's de-
fense.17 The right to control the defense of litigation is part of the
insurer's business, and it is certainly one of the services an insured
bargains for when purchasing liability insurance.18 Policy provisions
giving an insurer the right to control the defense of litigation amount
to an insured's advance consent to the insurer's employment of its cho-
sen defense attorney.' 9 By retaining the ability to select counsel of
their choice, insurers are better able to economically and effectively
defend claims,20 participate in strategic decisions, and seize settle-
ment opportunities.21
15. Lime Tree Village Community Club Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 980
F.2d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir. 1993); Harrow Prods., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 833
F. Supp. 1239, 1248 (W.D. Mich. 1993); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Worthey, 861
S.W.2d 307, 310 (Ark. 1993); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792,
796 (Cal. 1993); Biborosch v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 603 A.2d 1050, 1052 (Pa.
Super. Ct.), appeal denied, 615 A.2d 1310 (Pa. 1992); Elliott v. Donahue, 485
N.W.2d 403, 407 (Wis. 1992). See also S.G. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
460 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)(stating that when construing insur-
ance contract, all doubts must be resolved in the insured's favor); American Econ-
omy Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 854 P.2d 500, 501 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)(construing
exclusions narrowly).
16. See MIC Prop. & Cas. Ins. Corp. v. International Ins. Co., 990 F.2d 573, 576-77
(10th Cir. 1993)(applying Oklahoma law); Columbia Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart,
Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993)(applying Texas law); Manzanita Park,
Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 549, 553 (9th Cir. 1988)(discussing Ari-
zona law and collateral estoppel); Hyatt Corp. v. Occidential Fire & Cas. Co., 801
S.W.2d 382, 388-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Ames v. Continental Cas. Co., 340
S.E.2d 479, 485 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
17. See Illinois Masonic Med. Ctr. v. Turegum Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d 611, 613 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988); Parker v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 440 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (Sup. Ct.
1981)("The purpose of such right is to allow insurers to protect their financial
interest in the outcome of litigation.... ."). See also Aberle v. Karn, 316 N.W.2d
779, 782 (N.D. 1982)(insurers' right to control defense "justified by a substantial
public interest in orderly and proper disposition" of claims).
18. Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Cal. 1993)("The
insured's desire to secure ... the insurer's ... defense of third party claims is, in
all likelihood, typically as significant a motive for the purchase of insurance as is
the wish to obtain indemnity for possible liability."); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Superior Court, 166 Cal. Rptr. 904, 910 (Ct. App. 1980)(Smith, A.J., dissenting).
19. Brady & McKee, supra note 1, at 231.
20. Insurers are usually best able to select competent defense counsel with whom
they have negotiated favorable hourly rates.
21. "Insureds share their insurers' interest in reducing total claims costs. Without
prudent claims administration, insurance might be unaffordable .... Inevitably,
increased costs of insurers result in increased costs to insureds." John K. Morris,
Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed
Solution, 1981 UTAH L. Rv. 457, 460.
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The tripartite relationship between insurer, insured, and insur-
ance defense counsel is unique.2 2 In no other area of the law are par-
ties routinely represented by counsel selected and paid by a third
party whose interests may differ from those of the individual or entity
the attorney was hired to defend.23 The potential for conflict is inher-
ent in the tripartite relationship. The source of most conflicts of inter-
est, both actual and perceived, is the "dual client doctrine." The dual
client doctrine reflects a widespread recognition that insurance de-
fense counsel are deemed to have two clients in any given case: the
insurer and the insured.24
The problems posed by the dual client doctrine rest on the premise
that insurance defense counsel cannot loyally represent the insured in
any situation posing an actual or potential conflict of interest with the
insurer.2 5 Insurance defense counsel are generally specialists doing a
substantial volume of business with several carriers.2 6 The close eco-
nomic and personal relationships that develop between defense attor-
neys and insurers arguably can lead to a reduced emphasis on
insureds' interests in particular cases. 2 7 This problem is exacerbated
by the fact that while a defense attorney generally has an on-going
22. Bruce L. Gelman, Note, The Insurance Company or the Insured: Where Does De-
fense Counsel's Loyalty Really Lie?, 70 U. DEW. MERCY L. REV. 215, 215 (1992).
23. See id. at 215.
24. Robert E. O'Malley, Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured and Defense
Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed, 66 TuxAm L. REV. 511, 511 (1991).
The existence of an attorney-client relationship between an insurer and the attor-
ney it hires to defend its insured has been recognized by numerous courts. See,
e.g., Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Medical Protective Co., 107 F.R.D. 393, 394-95 (E.D.
Mo. 1985); Mitchum v. Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 198 (Ala. 1988); Chi of Alaska,
Inc. v. Employers Reins. Corp., 844 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Alaska 1993); Bogard v.
Employers Cas. Co., 210 Cal. Rptr. 578, 582 (Ct. App. 1985); Pennsylvania Ins.
Guar. Ass'n v. Sikes, 590 S.2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Nandorf v.
CNA Ins. Cos., 479 N.E.2d 988, 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 268 (Miss. 1988); Lieberman v. Employers
Ins., 419 A.2d 417, 423-25 (N.J. 1980). But see Continental Cas. Co. v. Pullman,
Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1991)("It is clear beyond
cavil that ... the attorney owes his allegiance not to the insurance company that
retained him, but to the insured.. . ."); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 751
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989)(CIt is universally declared that [insur-
ance defense] counsel represents the insured and not the insurer."); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Stites Prof. Law Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 570, 575 (Ct. App.
1991)(insurer had no contractual right to actually control defense, so it had no
attorney-client relationship with defense counsel); Atlanta Int'l Ins. Co. v Bell,
475 N.W.2d 294, 297-99 (Mich. 1991)(no attorney-client relationship between in-
surer and defense counsel). For a confused analysis of the dual client doctrine in
connection with claims of privilege, see Catino v. Travelers Ins. Co., 136 F.R.D.
534, 537 (D. Mass. 1991).
25. See O'Malley, supra note 24, at 514.
26. Morris, supra note 21, at 463.
27. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1978):
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relationship with an insurer-fueled by a desire for future business-
the attorney's relationship with the insured is usually limited to the
defense of a single case.
The dual client doctrine spawns numerous costly and time-con-
suming distractions for insurers, insureds, and attorneys.28 As ex-
plained by the Vice Chairman and Loss Prevention Counsel of the
Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc. ("ALAS"), one of the larg-
est and most sophisticated legal malpractice insurers:
These distractions include: 1) Insureds not being candid with defense counsel;
2) Defense counsel must at all times be alert to potential conflicts between
insured and insurer; 3) Significant conflicts must be disclosed to and discussed
with the insured and the insurer; 4) If a conflict develops, defense counsel
must obtain consent of both "clients" in order to proceed; 5) An analysis must
be made as to whether a given conflict of interest is so serious as to be noncon-
sentable; 6) If the conflict is nonconsentable, defense counsel must resign; 7) If
the insured is entitled to separate counsel in place of, or in addition to, the
original appointed defense counsel, who is responsible for that expense?; 8) In
any event, if separate or independent counsel represents the insured, who
controls the defense?; 9) In view of the 'joint confidences" or "co-client" doc-
trine (i.e., there is no attorney-client privilege or obligation of confidentiality
between and among two or more clients-the insured and the insurer-and
their common lawyer, defense counsel), is defense counsel obligated or permit-
ted to disclose to one of the clients information that is unfavorable to the
other?; and 10) Defense counsel is, at all times, concerned about potential mal-
practice liability.2 9
When the usually harmonious tripartite relationship is disrupted
by the appearance of a conflict of interest between insurer and in-
sured, defense counsel are left to walk an ethical tightrope. A defense
attorney's misstep can result in malpractice liability, discipline for a
breach of ethics rules, a loss of coverage defenses for the insurer, or
some unpleasant combination of the three.30
Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize
that an attorney employed by an insurance company will slant his ef-
forts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interests of his real client-the one
who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future busi-
ness-the insurance company.
Id. at 938 n.5. See also Rose v. Royal Ins. Co., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 483, 487 (Ct. App.
1991)("Where an insurer is called upon to defend its insured, the attorney re-
tained by the insurer may have a compelling interest in perfecting the insurer's
position, whether or not it coincides with what is best for the insured.").
In most cases this concern is unfounded. As a rule, the insurer and its insured
share a common interest in minimizing or defeating a third-party claim. See San
Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498
(Ct. App. 1984); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 639 A.2d 652, 658 (Md. 1994).
28. See O'Malley, supra note 24, at 515.
29. See id. at 515-16.
30. See Debra A. Winiarski, Walking the Fine Line: A Defense Counsel's Perspective,
28 TORT & INs. L.J. 596, 597 (1993).
19941
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The tripartite relationship between insurer, insured, and defense
counsel makes potential conflicts of interest inevitable. Insureds are
threatened by conflicts because of the effect on their defense. Conflicts
of interest may strip insurers of coverage defenses and expose them to
the threat of extracontractual damages. From defense counsel's per-
spective, with potential conflicts of interest come potential malpractice
claims. The fundamental malpractice danger posed by conflicts of in-
terest is that the insured (the client) will allege that defense counsel
protected the insurer's interest at the insured's expense, and to the
insured's ultimate detriment. What follows is an examination of the
most common potential conflicts of interest attributable to the tripar-
tite relationship.
A. Reservation of Rights
An insurer often undertakes its insured's defense with coverage
questions unanswered, or with coverage issues unresolved. Under
such circumstances, the possibility exists that the insured will con-
tend that by assuming the defense, the insurer is estopped to deny
coverage, or has waived its right to contest coverage.31 To foreclose
estoppel or waiver arguments, insurers routinely send reservation of
rights letters via certified mail. A reservation of rights letter is an
insurer's unilateral declaration that it reserves the right to deny cov-
erage, despite its initial decision to defend. One purpose of a reserva-
tion of rights letter is to enable the insured to make intelligent
decisions relative to protecting the insured's own interests in the face
of possible coverage denials and conflicts of interest. The insurer must
therefore specifically reference the policy defenses which may ulti-
mately be asserted, and inform the insured of the potential conflict of
interest its reservation creates.3 2 Reservation of rights letters which
are not specific are usually ineffective. A reservation of rights letter
does not evidence an insured's consent to the insurer's conditional
representation.33
An insurer's reservation of rights presents a classic conflict of in-
terest. There always exists the possibility that a liability insurer
which reserves its rights has a diminished interest in its insured's de-
31. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 605.
32. See Royal Ins. Co. v. Process Design Assocs., 582 N.E.2d 1234, 1239 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991). See also Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Myers, 789 F.2d 1196, 1197-1201 (5th Cir.
1986)(discussing effective reservation of rights letter); Knox-Tenn Rental Co. v.
Home Ins. Co., 833 F. Supp. 665, 667-69 (E.D. Tenn. 1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 678 (6th
Cir. 1993)(holding reservation of rights was not clearly and fairly communicated
to insured, and was therefore ineffective).
33. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 606.
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fense, since it might later prevail on the coverage issue.3 4 Defense
counsel can often steer a case toward a coverage result favorable to
the insurer. For example, a defense attorney may elicit deposition tes-
timony supporting a coverage defense. If these arguments are
credited, a conflict can be avoided only if (1) appointed defense counsel
withdraws, or (2) the insured is allowed to select his own independent
counsel at the insurer's expense. It is the latter solution that has
caused innumerable problems for the insurance industry.
In 1984, a California appellate court stunned the industry when it
suggested that an insurer's reservation of rights always poses a con-
flict of interest, potentially requiring the insured's engagement of in-
dependent counsel at the insurer's expense. In San Diego Navy
Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc.,35 the plaintiff
sued several of the defendant's insureds on a variety of contract and
tort theories, seeking $750,000 in compensatory damages and
$6,500,000 in punitives.3 6 The insurer's associate counsel, Willis
McAllister, hired the firm of Goebel & Monaghan to represent Cumis'
insureds, simultaneously telling the firm that the carrier was reserv-
ing its right to later deny coverage, and that its policies did not cover
punitive damages. McAllister never asked Goebel & Monaghan for a
coverage opinion, and the firm offered no coverage advice to Cumis or
its insureds. McAllister wrote each of Cumis' insureds, reserving the
company's right to disclaim coverage and denying any coverage for pu-
nitive damages.3 7
The Credit Union hired the firm of Saxon, Alt & Brewer ("Saxon")
as co-counsel to protect the defendants' interests. Saxon presented
Cumis with two invoices for fees and costs, which McAllister was per-
suaded to pay.3 8 McAllister declined to pay further Saxon invoices,
having conferred with his home office and with Goebel & Monaghan,
all concluding that there was no conflict of interest.3 9 At a later settle-
ment conference, the plaintiff offered to settle within policy limits.
Cumis authorized Goebel & Monaghan to make a settlement offer at
34. "A reservation of rights may chill a zealous defense based on the insurer's assess-
ment of the liability and it presents a possible conflict of interest because the
insurer may be more concerned with developing facts showing non-coverage than
facts defeating liability." Missouri ex rel. Rimco, Inc. v. Dowd, 858 S.W.2d 307,
308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). See also Rockwell Intl Corp. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 153, 158 (Ct. App. 1994) (observing that the insured's goal of coverage
flies in the face of the insurer's desire to avoid its duty to indemnify under a
reservation of rights).
35. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1984).
36. The plaintiff alleged wrongful discharge, breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, wrongful interference with and inducing breach of contract, breach
of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 496.
37. Id.




the conference, but below the plaintiff's demand. Goebel & Monaghan
did not communicate with the Credit Union before or during the set-
tlement conference, instead informing the Credit Union about the con-
ference afterward.40 The trial court concluded that Cumis was
obligated to pay the Credit Union's past and future expenses related
to Saxon's engagement.
On appeal, Cumis argued that it could not be required to pay for its
insured's independent counsel. The Cumis appellate court affirmed
the trial court, stating:
We conclude ... lawyers hired by [an] insurer [have] an obligation to explain
to the insured and the insurer the full implications of joint representation in
situations where the insurer has reserved its rights to deny coverage. If the
insured does not give an informed consent to continued representation, coun-
sel must cease to represent both. Moreover, in the absence of such consent,
where there are divergent interests of the insured and the insurer brought
about by the insurer's reservation of rights based on possible noncoverage
under the insurance policy, the insurer must pay the reasonable cost for hir-
ing independent counsel by the insured. The insurer may not compel the in-
sured to surrender control of the litigation .... 41
Although both the insurer and insured shared a common interest in
winning the third-party action, their remaining interests were so di-
vergent "as to create an actual, ethical conflict of interest" warranting
independent counsel. 42
The court in Cumis reasoned that the insurer's desire to establish
in the third-party suit that the insured's liability rested on intentional
conduct (thus being excluded from coverage) and the insured's desire
to base liability on its negligent conduct (thereby triggering coverage)
represented opposing poles of interest.43 While recognizing that cov-
erage issues would not be actually litigated in the third-party action,
the court believed that this would not spare appointed insurance de-
fense counsel from the force of these opposing interests, given the dual
representation. 44 The appellate court accepted the trial court's rea-
soning that the carrier was required to pay for independent counsel
because defense counsel would be tempted to develop the facts to help
his real client, the insurer, as opposed to the insured, for whom he
would likely never work again.45 Given the close-knit nature of insur-
ance defense practice, a defense attorney who did not first protect an
insurer's interest might well lose business.46
Cumis led to the widespread use of so-called "Cumis counsel." In-
sureds who found themselves being defended under a reservation of
40. Id.
41. Id. at 506 (citations omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 498.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 497-98.
46. See id. at 498.
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rights in California almost always engaged independent counsel.
Cumis had "extremely adverse economic consequences" in California
and other states following California's lead, driving up litigation
costs.47 The Cumis economic burden was the product of several ele-
ments. First, unscrupulous attorneys were able to masquerade as
necessary Cumis counsel by manufacturing phony conflicts of interest,
thereby defrauding insurers.48 Second, Cumis counsel are often able
to charge insurers fees well in excess of those insurers negotiate with
their regular panel counsel. Finally, independent counsel often lack
the experience and skill of the insurer's regular counsel.4 9 As a result,
pretrial matters may be handled less efficiently and the probability of
a favorable outcome reduced.5 0
California narrowed the broad holding of Cumis through a series of
subsequent decisions.51 Not every reservation of rights creates a con-
flict of interest requiring the engagement of independent counsel.52
The necessity of independent counsel now depends on the nature of
the coverage question as it relates to the underlying case. Cumis
counsel is not required if the issue on which coverage hinges is in-
47. Brady & McKee, supra note 1, at 232-33.
48. For example, a group of California attorneys known as "The Alliance" may have
defrauded insurers out of as much as $200,000,000 by exploiting bogus conflicts
of interest. Id. at 233.
49. Id.
50. These problems may be resolved by holding the insured to a duty of good faith
and fair dealing. As the California Court of Appeal observed:
In our view, the duty of good faith imposed upon an insured includes the
obligation to act reasonably in selecting as independent counsel an ex-
perienced attorney qualified to present a meaningful defense and willing
to engage in ethical billing practices susceptible to review at a standard
stricter than that of the marketplace. Conduct arguably acceptable in
the ordinary attorney-client relationship where the latter pays the for-
mer from his own pocket is not necessarily appropriate in the tripartite
context when independent counsel undertakes to represent the insured
at the expense of the insurer.
Center Found. v. Chicago Ins. Co., 278 Cal. Rptr. 13, 21 (Ct. App. 1991). The
Alaska Supreme Court held in Chi of Alaska v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.,
844 P.2d 1113 (Alaska 1993), that the insurer was obligated to pay only the "rea-
sonable cost of defense" provided by independent counsel. Id. at 1121. While the
insured had a unilateral right to select independent counsel, it also had a duty to
"select an attorney who is, by experience and training, reasonably thought to be
competent to conduct the defense .... " Id. at 1125. The Chi of Alaska court
believed that this approach balanced both parties' interests.
51. See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Wilks, 253 Cal. Rptr. 596, 601-603 (Ct. App.
1988)(concluding mere punitive damage claim does not create conflict of interest);
Native Sun Inv. Group v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 235 Cal. Rptr. 34, 39-40 (Ct. App.
1987)(resolution of underlying case would not control outcome of coverage dis-
pute; thus, Cumis counsel not required); McGee v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. Rptr.
421, 424 (Ct. App. 1985)(reservation of rights based on a collateral issue that
would not be developed at trial, so independent counsel not required).
52. Blanchard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884,887 (Ct. App. 1991).
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dependent of the issues in the third-party action. As explained by the
court in Blanchard v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,53 "[a] conflict
of interest does not arise unless the outcome of the coverage issue can
be controlled by counsel first retained by the insurer for the defense of
the underlying claim."54
Not all courts accepted the Cumis view that appointed counsel can-
not be trusted to serve the interests of those they are hired to defend.
In Siebert Oxidermo, Inc. v. Shields,55 an Indiana court flatly rejected
an insured's argument that its appointed counsel had an economic in-
terest in failure, thus supporting the insurer's coverage defense.
We consider the argument impertinent, if not scandalous. Without consider-
ing the respected reputation of the attorney involved, we point out that on a
daily basis defense attorneys employed by insurance carriers ... are called
upon to deal with matters in litigation where the interests of the policyholder
and the carrier do not fully coincide. Under such circumstances the attorney's
duty is, of course, to the insured whom he has been employed to represent. In
response the defense bar has exhibited no inability to fully comply with both
the letter and spirit of... the Code of Professional Responsibility. If it were
otherwise, we suspect the desirability of requiring carriers to supply defense
counsel would have long since disappeared as a term of the policy. 5 6
The Supreme Court of Missouri faced a slightly different conflict in
In re Allstate Insurance Co.57 Allstate employed full-time salaried at-
torneys to defend cases in which coverage was uncontested and
claimed damages fell within policy limits. The informants argued that
a liability insurer could not assign its own in-house attorneys to de-
fend its insureds without creating conflicts of interest.5 8 Noting that
both in-house and appointed counsel were bound by ethics rules re-
quiring withdrawal if a conflict appeared, the court in Allstate dis-
agreed. The court reasoned that there was "no basis for a conclusion
that employed lawyers have less regard for the Rules of Professional
Conduct than private practitioners do." 59
One way to resolve the conflict posed by a defense under a reserva-
tion of rights is to impose an "enhanced" duty of good faith on the re-
serving insurer.60 This approach was first taken by the Washington
53. Id.
54. Id. at 887. See also Northern Ins. Co. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 955 F.2d 1353, 1359
(9th Cir. 1992)(applying California law).
55. 430 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 446 N.E.2d 332 (Ind. 1983).
56. Id. at 403.
57. 722 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1987).
58. See id. at 951.
59. Id. at 953.
60. "A duty to act in good faith is part of every insurance contract." Kansas Bankers
Sur. Co. v. Lynass, 920 F.2d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1990). It is widely-recognized that
insurers owe their insureds a duty of good faith and fair dealing sounding in tort.
See, e.g., Lissmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 50, 53 (4th Cir. 1988);
Hamed v. General Accident Ins. Co., 842 F.2d 170, 172 (7th Cir. 1988);
Broadhead v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 773 F. Supp. 882, 905 (S.D. Miss. 1991),
276 [Vol. 73:265
TRIPARTITE RELATIONSHIP
Supreme Court in Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.61 The
Tank court explained:
We have stated that the duty of good faith of an insurer requires fair dealing
and equal consideration for the insured's interests.... [The same standard of
fair dealing and equal consideration is unquestionably applicable to a reserva-
tion-of-rights defense. We find, however, that the potential conflicts of inter-
est between insurer and insured inherent in this type of defense mandate an
even higher standard: an insurance company must fulfill an enhanced obliga-
tion to its insured as part of its duty of good faith.6 2
Insurers can meet Tank's enhanced obligation of good faith by (1) thor-
oughly investigating the plaintiff's claim; (2) retaining competent de-
fense counsel who, like the insurer, must understand that the insured
is the sole client; (3) fully informing the insured of all coverage ques-
tions or issues and related developments, and of the progress of the
lawsuit; and (4) refraining from any action that demonstrates a
greater concern for the insurer's monetary interests than for the in-
sured's financial risk.63 Failure to satisfy this enhanced obligation
may expose the insurer and defense counsel to liability.64
In L & S Roofing Supply Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.,65 the Alabama Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the court
in Tank. In L & S Roofing, the court concluded that the Tank stan-
dard and specified criteria provided an adequate means for safeguard-
ing insureds' interests without questioning the integrity or loyalty of
insurance defense counsel. 66
aff'd, 979 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1992); Turner Ins. Agency v. Continental Cas. Ins.
Co., 541 So. 2d 471, 472 (Ala. 1989); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571-72
(Ariz. 1986); Globe Indem. Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251, 255 (Ct.
App. 1992); Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274,276 (Ga. 1992); White
v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Idaho 1986); Erie Ins. Co. v. Hick-
man, 622 N.E.2d 515, 518-19 (Ind. 1993); North Iowa State Bank v. Allied Mut.
Ins. Co., 471 N.W.2d 824, 828-29 (Iowa 1991); Ganaway v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.,
795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Braesch v. Union Ins. Co., 237 Neb. 44,
48-49, 464 N.W.2d 769, 772 (1991); Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Said, 590 N.E.2d
1228, 1232 (Ohio 1992); Townsend v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d
236, 237-38 (Okla. 1993); Georgetown Realty, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 831 P.2d 7
(Or. 1992); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 S.E.2d 616, 618-19
.(S.C. 1983); Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987); McCullough v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 855, 858 (Wyo. 1990).
Plaintiffs may recover for an insurer's bad faith even when the event giving rise
to a loss is not covered by the policy. See, e.g., First Tex. Say. Ass'n v. Reliance
Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 1171, 1178-79 (5th Cir. 1992)(interpreting Texas unfair insur-
ance practices statute); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499 (Wash. 1992).
61. 715 P.2d 1133 (Wash. 1986).
62. Id. at 1137.
63. See I.
64. Id
65. 521 So. 2d 1298 (Ala. 1987).
66. See id. at 1304.
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Ultimately, how potential conflicts of interest should be resolved
when an insurer reserves its rights is a matter of perspective. 6 7 Those
who trust appointed counsel to afford insureds undivided loyalty, and
to vigorously defend them, see no conflict in a reservation of rights
defense. On the other hand, those who presume insurance defense at-
torneys will inevitably be influenced by the insurers with whom they
have business relationships view the broad right to independent coun-
sel once granted by Cumis as the only viable solution.
B. Claimed Damages Exceed Coverage
Cases in which claimed damages exceed coverage provide the po-
tential for conflicts. The situation is especially serious if defense coun-
sel believes that the jury verdict, and not just the amount stated in an
ad damnum clause or prayer for relief, may exceed coverage. Conflicts
arise when solid potential liability defenses exist, but defense counsel
knows that the case can be settled within policy limits. One conflict, of
course, stems from the insured's entitlement to defense counsel who
will advance only the insured's interests in such a situation.68 At the
same time, the insurer has a powerful economic incentive to litigate
aggressively in the hope of obtaining a low verdict. This situation
poses genuine practical problems for defense counsel; after all, insur-
ers do not hire them simply to give away money. Woe be it to defense
counsel who are unwilling to try tough cases.
The attorney assigned a case with a potential excess judgment
must at a minimum inform both the insured and insurer of any settle-
ment offer so that they may take steps necessary to protect their inter-
ests. At least one court has suggested that counsel do nothing more
than inform both parties. The court in Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Foster69 cautioned that the defense attorney should limit his
role to responding to "questions pertaining to the law and facts of the
case."70 Defense counsel should be careful not to violate the "absolute,
nondelegable responsibility not to urge, recommend or suggest any
course of action to the carrier which violates his conflict of interest
obligation."7 1
A defense attorney who fails to settle a case within policy limits
despite the opportunity to do so may be personally liable for any ex-
67. See JERRY, supra note 2, at 607.
68. See Parsons v. Continental Natl Am. Group, 550 P.2d 94, 98 (Ariz. 1976)(defense
counsel owes insured undeviating and single allegiance); Purdy v. Pacific Auto.
Ins. Co., 203 Cal. Rptr. 524,533 (Ct. App. 1984)(defense counsel's primary duty is
to further the insured's best interests).
69. 528 So. 2d 255 (Miss. 1988).




cess judgment. In Mutuelles Unies v. Kroll & Linstrom,72 a defense
firm was slapped with a $2,183,381 malpractice verdict when the
plaintiff in the underlying action demanded $1,000,000 to settle, but
trial counsel refused to offer more than $900,000.73 The malpractice
victor was the liability insurer, which recovered the difference be-
tween the plaintiffs' lowest settlement figure and the jury verdict in
the third-party action.
C. Defense Costs Reduce Available Coverage
Liability coverage is sometimes provided under what is known va-
riably as a "defense within limits," "wasting," or "ultimate net loss"
policy. These insurance policies provide that defense costs, such as
attorneys' fees, are paid out of policy limits. In other words, defense
costs erode or reduce available coverage. An insured is potentially
prejudiced every time her appointed counsel acts, since every dollar
the attorney earns in fees reduces the available coverage. In such
cases, insureds must always be timely informed of defense expendi-
tures and the amount of remaining coverage.
D. Representation of Multiple Parties
As is generally true, the representation of multiple parties
presents serious potential conflicts. Two or more insureds may have
adverse interests. This is particularly true' in automobile liability
cases, in which a passenger frequently sues both the driver and the
owner.74 It may be in the driver's best interests to be viewed as the
owners agent, while the owner's interest might be best served by ar-
guing that the driver was operating the vehicle without permission.75
Under such circumstances, independent counsel paid by the insurer is
required. 76 The same situation sometimes arises in products liability
actions in which multiple manufacturers or distributors may be in-
sured by the same carrier. For example, the manufacturer of a piece
of industrial equipment and the manufacturer of a component part in
that machine both may have the same insurer. Because the machine
manufacturer may allege that the component part was defective, and
might thus allege its manufacturer's comparative fault, the parties'
interests are necessarily adverse.
An unusual situation involving multiple parties was litigated in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Armstrong Extin-
72. 957 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1992).
73. See id. at 710-11.
74. See, e.g., Murphy v. Urso, 430 N.E.2d 1079 (Ill. 1981).
75. See id. at 1083-84.




guisher Service, Inc.7 7 The defendant and third-party plaintiff in the
underlying state court action sued Armstrong and its employee,
Michael Larson, alleging Larson's contributory fault and Armstrong's
vicarious liability in connection with an automobile accident. Larson
was one of the drivers involved in the crash. Armstrong's insurer
hired one of its regular defense attorneys, Curt Ireland, to represent
both Armstrong and Larson; however, State Farm defended under a
reservation of rights.78 In depositions, a conflict was discovered that
required Ireland to cease representing both Armstrong and Larson.
Ireland withdrew as Larson's counsel, but continued to represent
Armstrong. 79
The carrier then filed a declaratory judgment action in federal
court, seeking a determination that Armstrong's policy afforded no
coverage. Both Armstrong and Larson were named as defendants.
The attorney who prosecuted the declaratory judgment action for
State Farm was none other than Ireland, who was still defending
Armstrong.8 0 While admitting State Farm's right to seek a declara-
tory judgment,81 attorneys defending Armstrong and Larson in that
action moved to disqualify Ireland, alleging his conflict of interest.
Ireland opposed the motion on three grounds. First, both defendants
were sent reservation of rights letters at the outset of the state court
litigation.8 2 Second, the defendants were fully advised of the coverage
issue, and were also fully advised of their right to retain independent
counsel.8 3 Third, the coverage dispute was but a separate contractual
question for judicial determination which did not compromise his loy-
alty to Armstrong.8 4
The court in Armstrong Extinguisher made short work of Ireland's
arguments.
State Farm has not given equal consideration to Larson's and Armstrong's
interests in this case. Mr. Ireland as counsel for Armstrong, and at one time
Larson, owes a duty of loyalty to his clients and cannot under the South Da-
kota Rules of Professional Conduct represent parties with conflicting interests
without the consent of all parties after full disclosure of the facts.... At the
very least, Mr. Ireland's representation of the insurance company in the de-
claratory judgment action and Armstrong in the underlying litigation creates
an appearance of impropriety.
8 5
Ireland's decision to simultaneously represent Armstrong and actively
work against it created a classic conflict of interest. The court re-
77. 791 F. Supp. 799 (D.S.D. 1992).
78. Id. at 800.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 801.
82. Id. at 800.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 801.
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moved Ireland from the declaratory judgment action and required
State Farm to obtain new counsel.8 6
E. Counsel's Defense Activities Generate Information
Suggesting a Possible Coverage Defense
Even with informed consent, dual representation creates disclo-
sure and communication problems for insurance defense counsel.87
Confidential communications pose the thorniest problems for defense
attorneys.8 8 When appointed counsel learns of information sug-
gesting a possible coverage defense during the course of an insured's
representation, an obvious conflict of interest arises. It does not mat-
ter whether defense counsel generates the information through in-
dependent activities or efforts, or whether the insured shares the
information in confidence; in both scenarios defense counsel are gener-
ally barred from disclosing the information to the insurer.
In Parsons v. Continental National American Group,89 the insurer,
CNA, appointed counsel to defend its insureds, the Smitheys, in con-
nection with their son's alleged assault on three neighbors. The de-
fense attorney's activities led him to believe that the boy's attack of
the neighbors was an intentional act and he so informed CNA. The
CNA claims representative then sent the Smitheys a reservation of
rights letter, stating that the act involved might have been intentional
and that their policy specifically excluded liability for bodily injury
caused by an intentional act.9 0 The case ultimately went to trial and
the plaintiffs obtained a $50,000 directed verdict against the insured's
son, which was in excess of the $25,000 policy limits. Judgment was
then entered in the verdict amount.9 '
The plaintiffs garnished CNA, which responded by offering to set-
tle for its $25,000 policy limits. The plaintiffs declined CNA's offer.
CNA successfully defended the garnishment action by asserting its in-
tentional acts exclusion. The same attorney that defended the
Smitheys at trial represented CNA in the garnishment action.92
The plaintiffs contended that CNA was estopped to deny coverage
and waived the intentional acts exclusion because the company ex-
ploited the fiduciary relationship between defense counsel and the
86. Id. at 802.
87. Hall, supra note 8, at 753.
88. See Eric M. Holmes, A Conflicts-of-Interest Roadmap for Insurance Defense Coun-
sel: Walking an Ethical Tightrope Without a Net, 26 WiLLAhTIr L. REV. 1, 63-64
(1989).
89. 550 P.2d 94 (Ariz. 1976).
90. Id. at 96.
91. Id. at 96-97.
92. Id. at 97.
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Smithey's son.9 3 The court agreed. First noting that the defense at-
torney obtained privileged and confidential information about the boy
by virtue of the attorney-client relationship, 94 the court held:
When an attorney... uses the confidential relationship between an attorney
and a client to gather information so as to deny the insured coverage under
the policy in the garnishment proceeding we hold that such conduct consti-
tutes a waiver of any policy defense, and is so contrary to public policy that
the insurance company is estopped as a matter of law from disclaiming liabil-
ity under an exclusionary clause in the policy.
9 5
CNA was ultimately held liable for the full amount of the excess
judgment.9 6
Parsons illustrates attorneys' need to ascertain how to handle con-
fidential information material to both clients, but known only to one.
Attorneys who fail to understand their fiduciary obligations unneces-
sarily expose themselves to malpractice liability. Depending on the
jurisdiction, both insured and insurer are potential malpractice
plaintiffs.
F. Punitive Damages Are Claimed
Depending on the jurisdiction and the facts of the particular case, a
plaintiff who pursues a punitive damage claim may create a conflict of
interest. Liability insurers which are not obligated to indemnify their
insureds for punitive damage awards97 may be thought to have no in-
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 99.
96. Id. at 99-100.
97. The question of insurance coverage for punitive damages plagues courts, insur-
ers, and insureds. Many liability insurance policies do not expressly exclude pu-
nitive damages from coverage. Standard policy language providing that an
insurer will pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages" is frequently held to be so broad as to include punitive damages.
See, e.g., Insurance Reserve Fund v. Prince, 403 S.E.2d 643, 648 (S.C. 1991). In
some states, insurance policies covering bodily injury, personal injury, and prop-
erty damage do not cover punitive damages unless other policy language provides
for the payment of punitive damages. See, e.g., Union L.P. Gas Sys., Inc. v. Inter-
national Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 869 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (8th Cir. 1989); Heart-
land Stores, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co., 815 S.W.2d 39, 42-43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
There is a split among jurisdictions as to the insurability of punitive damages.
Some states prohibit the insurability of punitive damages as a matter of public
policy, fearing that the goals of punishment and deterrence would be undermined
by insurance, or that the financial burden resulting from punitive damage
awards would ultimately rest with other, blameless insureds. See, e.g., Allen v.
Simmons, 533 A.2d 541, 543-44 (R.I. 1987). Jurisdictions which allow punitive
damage insurance usually have a much lower threshold for awarding punitive
damages, imposing only a gross negligence or similar standard. See Continental
Cas. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 762 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff'd, 953
F.2d 1386 (9th Cir.), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 399 (1992). For a thoughtful discussion
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terest in defending against such claims.9 8 Insureds, on the other
hand, have a vital interest in avoiding punitive damages. Defense
counsel must inform both the insurer and the insured of punitive dam-
age exposure so that they may protect their respective interests.
G. The Insurer Attempts to Limit Discovery to Reduce
Expenses
Occasionally an insurer will attempt to restrict defense counsel's
discovery activities in an effort to reduce litigation costs. Counsel may
be instructed not to propound written discovery, or might be told to
forego certain depositions. Such restrictions create potential conflicts
of interest if they inhibit an attorney's ability to adequately defend a
case, or interfere with the attorney's independent professional judg-
ment. The potential for conflict is aggravated if potential damages ex-
ceed coverage, giving the insured a legitimate concern in the litigation
result.
Ethics rules generally prevent an attorney from representing a cli-
ent (the insured) if that representation may be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client (the insurer). For exam-
ple, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide in Rule 5.4(c)
that a lawyer shall not permit one who employs or pays another to
represent a client to "direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judg-
ment in rendering such legal services."99 A defense attorney may
have to conduct discovery regardless of an insurer's stated unwilling-
ness to pay. An insured may have to be informed of imposed discovery
limitations, or written consent to counsel's continued representation
may be required, in order to avoid conflicts.
IV. ETHICS RULES GOVERNING INSURANCE
DEFENSE COUNSEL
Although the tripartite relationship is unique to insurance defense,
appointed counsel are subject to the same ethics rules that govern
their colleagues in other practice areas. Most states have now adopted
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. 0 0 Several of these rules are directly applicable to insurance de-
fense practice.
of the insurability of punitive damages, including policy and theoretical bases,
see JERRY, supra note 2, at 349-54.
98. See, e.g., Emons Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 749 F. Supp. 1289, 1298
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
99. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 5.4(c)(1983).
100. Currently, 37 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct with some amendments. Brooke Wunnicke, The Eternal
Triangle Revisited. The Insurance Defense Lawyer and Conflicts of Interest, FOR
THE DEFENSE, Nov. 1993, at 20, 20. This Article does not discuss the Model Code
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A. Model Rule 1.7
Model Rule 1.7 is the primary rule pertaining to conflicts of inter-
est.101 Rule 1.7 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
will be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely
affect the relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client
may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be ad-
versely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multi-
ple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include
explanation of the implications of the common representation and the ad-
vantages and risks involved.
1 0 2
Rule 1.7(b) applies to situations in which an insurer limits discov-
ery in an effort to reduce litigation costs. Section (b)(2) apparently
requires defense counsel who anticipate future conflicts of interest to
obtain their dual clients' consent to representation. 0 3 The rule addi-
tionally contemplates dual representation only after both clients have
been fully informed about possible benefits and disadvantages.
Comment 10 to Rule 1.7 is also relevant to the tripartite relation-
ship.104 The comment states:
A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is
informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise
the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example, when
an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a
liability insurance agreement, and the insurer is required to provide special
counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special counsel's
professional independence.
1 0 5
An insured's execution of the insurance contract may amount to con-
sent to the insurer's payment of legal fees and expenses, so long as
defense counsel's loyalty is not compromised.
of Professional Responsibility which remains in effect in the states that have not
adopted some version of the Model Rules. In the remaining Model Code states,
"the provisions of the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations are not sub-
stantively different from the Model Rules" discussed in the following text.
O'Malley, supra note 24, at 516 n.27.
101. See O'Malley, supra note 24, at 518; Winiarski, supra note 30, at 597.
102. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT, Rule 1.7 (1983).
103. Murray and Bringus, supra note 3, at 284-85.
104. See OQ'Malley, supra note 24, at 519.
105. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr, Rule 1.7 cmt. 10 (1983).
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B. Model Rules 1.8() and 5.4(c)
Model Rules 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) directly apply to insurance defense
practice.S06 The applicability of Rule 1.8(f) is made clear by comment
10 to Rule 1.7. Rule 1.8 addresses conflicts of interest and prohibited
transactions. Paragraph (f) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one
other than the client unless:
(1) the client consents after consultation;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship; and
(3) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as re-
quired by rule 1.6.107
Compliance with Rule 1.8(f)(2) may require defense counsel to disa-
gree with the insurer in the control of the litigation. For example, a
defense attorney may have to disregard the insurer's instructions with
respect to strategic decisions.108
Rule 5.4 addresses a lawyer's professional independence. Para-
graph (c) states: "A lawyer shall not permit a person who recom-
mends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering such legal services."' 0 9 As noted previously, Rule 5.4(c)
comes into play if an insurer attempts to restrict defense counsel's ac-
tivities in an attempt to hold down defense costs.
C. Fraud and Confidentiality: Model Rules 1.2, 1.16, and 1.6
Insurance fraud is a disturbingly common problem. It is not un-
heard of for insureds to set fire to buildings they own, report nonexis-
tent losses, or conspire with named plaintiffs. Model Rule 1.2(d)
clearly forbids defense counsel from assisting or supporting an insured
who is attempting to defraud an insurer. According to Model Rule
1.2(d), "[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a cli-
ent, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent
"110
Another of the Model Rules related to fraud is 1.16(a)(1). Model
Rule 1.16(a)(1) requires defense counsel's resignation from an in-
sured's representation in the face of fraud. The rule provides that an
attorney "shall not represent a client or, where representation has
106. See O'Malley, supra note 24, at 519.
107. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT, Rule 1.8(f)(1983).
108. See Mallen, supra note 5, at 110.
109. MODEL Ru.Fs OF PROFEIONAL CoNDucr, Rule 5.4(c)(1983).
110. Id. Rule 1.2(d).
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
commenced, shall withdraw" if representation "will result in violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law. . . ."111
Model Rule 1.6 addresses a defense counsel's obligation to main-
tain confidentiality. In the case of an insured's fraud and defense
counsel's mandatory rejection of or withdrawal from representation in
accordance with Rule 1.2, the text of Rule 1.6 further requires that
counsel not reveal the fraud to the insurer.11 2 The "lip-sealing na-
ture"113 of Rule 1.6's text aside, comment 16 of the Rule provides:
After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making disclosure of
the client's confidences, except as otherwise provided in Rule 1.6. Neither this
Rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of
the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any
opinion, document, affirmation or the like. 1 1 4
Apparently, then, Rule 1.6 authorizes indirect or discreet disclosure of
an insured's fraud by way of a "noisy withdrawal."115 Some scholars
have described such a withdrawal as waving "the red flag."1l6
V. ATTEMPTED SOLUTIONS TO THE DUAL
CLIENT DILEMMA
The dual client doctrine (and thus the tripartite relationship) has
long been a concern of lawyers and insurers alike. In 1969, the Na-
tional Conference of Lawyers and Liability Insurers adopted Guiding
Principles for liability insurers.11 7 The American Bar Association
House of Delegates formally approved the Guiding Principles in
1972.11s The Guiding Principles read as follows:
I. General Statement
Under a policy providing liability insurance, the company has a direct fi-
nancial interest in any claim present against its insured which the company
may be obligated to defend or pay, and in any suit on such claim, whether or
not the company is named as a party. The company has the right to have
counsel of its own choice to defend this interest. So long as no conflict of inter-
ests exists, that counsel also represents the insured. If and when representa-
tion of the company by its attorney conflicts with the interest of the insured,
111. Id. Rule 1.16(a)(1)(emphasis added). See, e.g., Montanez v. Irizarry-Rodriguez,
641 A.2d 1079 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
112. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr, Rule 1.6 (1983).
113. O'Malley, supra note 24, at 517.
114. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.6 cmt. 16 (1983).
115. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 307 (1984); O'Malley, supra note 24, at
517.
116. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules
of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 O. L.
REV. 455, 484 (1984).
117. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF LAWYERS AND LnAB. INSURERS, Am. BAR ASS'N,
GUIDING PRINCIPLES, in FED'N INS. CouNs. Q. Summer 1970, at 93, 93 [hereinaf-
ter GUIDING PRINCIPLES].
118. O'Malley, supra note 24, at 513.
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the company and its attorney are under a duty to inform the insured of such
conflict and to invite him to retain his own counsel at his own expense.
II. Claim or Suit in Excess of Limits
In any claim where there is a probability that the damage will exceed the
limits of the policy and the company has retained counsel to defend the claim,
or in any suit in which the prayer of the complaint exceeds the limit of the
policy, or in which there is an unlimited or indefinite prayer for damages and
a probability that the verdict may exceed the coverage limit, the company or
its attorney should timely inform the insured of the danger of exposure in
excess of the limit of the policy. The insured should be invited to retain addi-
tional counsel at his own expense to advise him with respect to that exposure.
So long as the financial interest of the company in the outcome of the litiga-
tion continues, the company retains the exclusive right to control and conduct
the defense of the case, in good faith, subject to the right of the insured or such
additional attorney to participate.
M. Settlement Negotiations in Claims or Suits With Excess Exposure
In any claim where there is a probability that the damage will exceed the
limit of the policy and the company has retained counsel to defend the claim,
or in any suit in which it appears probable that an amount in excess of the
limit of the policy is involved, the company or its attorney should inform the
insured or any additional attorney retained by the insured at his own expense
of significant settlement negotiations, whether within or beyond the limits of
the policy. Upon request, the insured, or such additional attorney, shall be
entitled to be informed of all settlement negotiations. The company shall,
upon request, make available to the insured or such additional attorney all
pertinent factual information the company and its attorney may have for eval-
uation by the insured or such additional attorney.
IV. Conflicts of Interest Generally - Duties of Attorney
In any claim or in any suit where the attorney selected by the company to
defend the claim or action becomes aware of facts or information which indi-
cate to him a question of coverage in the matter being defended or any other
conflict of interest between the company and the insured with respect to the
defense of the matter, the attorney should promptly inform both the company
and the insured, preferably in writing, of the nature and extent of the conflict-
ing interest. In any such suit, the company or its attorney should invite the
insured to retain his own counsel at his own expense to represent his separate
interest.
V. Continuation by Attorney Even Though There is a Conflict of Interests
Where there is a question of coverage or other conflict of interest, the com-
pany and the attorney selected by the company to defend the claim or suit
should not thereafter continue to defend the insured in the matter in question
unless, after a full explanation for the coverage question, the insured acqui-
esces in the continuation of such defense.
If the insured acquiesces in the continuation of the defense in the pending
matter following a reservation of rights by the company or under an agree-
ment that the rights of the company and the insured as to the coverage ques-
tion are not waived or prejudiced, the company retains the exclusive right to
control and conduct the defense of the case in good faith, subject to the right of
the insured or the additional attorney acting at the expense of the insured to
participate.
If the insured refuses to permit the insurance company and the attorney
selected by the company to defend the claim or suit to continue the defense of
the pending matter while reserving the rights of the company and of the in-
sured as to the coverage question, or if the full protection of the separate inter-
ests of the insured and the company requires inconsistent contentions which
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cannot be presented in a common defense of the pending matter, the insur-
ance company or the insured should seek other procedures to resolve the cov-
erage question.
If facts or information indicating to the attorney a lack of coverage for the
insured should first come to the attention of the attorney after the trial for the
lawsuit has begun, the attorney should at the earliest opportunity inform and
advise the insured and the company of the possible conflicting interests of the
insured and the company. The attorney should further seek to provide both
the insured and the company with time and the opportunity to consider the
possible conflict of interests and to take appropriate steps to protect their indi-
vidual interests.
VI. Duty of Attorney Not to Disclose Certain Facts and Information
Where the attorney selected by the company to defend a claim or suit be-
comes aware of facts or information, imparted to him by the insured under
circumstances indicating the insured's belief that such disclosure would not be
revealed to the insurance company but would be treated as a confidential com-
munication to the attorney, which indicate to the attorney a lack of coverage,
then as to such matters, disclosures made directly to the attorney, should not
be revealed to the company by the attorney nor should the attorney discuss
with the insured the legal significance of the disclosure or the nature of the
coverage question.
VII. Counterclaims
In any suit where the company or the attorney selected by the company to
defend the suit becomes aware that the insured may have a claim for damages
against another party to the lawsuit, which is likely to be prejudiced or barred
unless it is asserted as a counterclaim in the pending action, the insured
should be advised that the pending suit may affect or impair such claim, that
the insurance policy does not provide coverage for any legal services or advice
as to such claim, and that the insured may wish to consult an attorney of his
choice with respect to it.
VIII. Suit Involving More Than One Insured in The Same Company
If the same company insures two or more parties to a lawsuit, whose inter-
ests are diverse, the complete factual investigation made by the company
should be made available to each insured or his attorney with the exception
that any statement given by one insured or his employees shall not volunta-
rily be given to any other party to the litigation whose interest may be adverse
to such insured or to any attorney representing such other party.
The company should employ separate attorneys not associated with one
another to defend each insured against whom any suit is brought, if the inter-
est of one such insured is diverse from or in conflict with that of any other
insured; and all insured should be informed by the company of the fact that it
insures the liability of the others and the method being employed to handle
the litigation.
IX. Withdrawal
In any case where the company or the attorney selected by the company to
defend the suit decides to withdraw from the defense of the action brought
against the insured, the insured should be fully advised of such decision and
the reasons therefor; and every reasonable effort should be made to avoid prej-
udice to or impairment of the rights of the insured.
X. Uninsured Motorist Coverage
The company should employ separate attorneys not associated with one
another to defend the company against a claim by the insured under the Unin-
sured Motorist Coverage, and to defend the insured in any suit brought
against the insured arising out of the same accident. If the controversy re-
garding the Uninsured Motorist Coverage has been disposed of before a law-
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suit has been commenced against the insured, the same attorney who
defended the company for the first instance could represent the insured in the
later lawsuit.
Any statement made by the insured to the company with respect to the
defense of any claim made against him arising out of the same accident should
not be used against the insured in order to defeat the insured's claim under
the Uninsured Motorist Coverage. 119
The ABA rescinded the Guiding Principles in August 1980, under
pressure from the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.120
The Guiding Principles are now widely disregarded, having been
contradicted by subsequent case law, ethics opinions, and the wide-
spread adoption of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.121 San
Diego Navy Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society,122 in
which the California Court of Appeal held that the insured was enti-
tled to separate counsel at the insurer's expense, eviscerated Principles
I, II, III, IV and V. The Guiding Principles were otherwise flawed.
For example, Principle VI provided that "[w]hen the attorney... be-
comes aware of facts or information... which indicate to the attorney
a lack of coverage.., the attorney [should not] discuss with the in-
sured the legal significance of the disclosure or the nature of the cover-
age question."'12 3 No responsible ethics authority would suggest that
insurance defense counsel should not discuss with the insured mate-
rial coverage issues.12 4 Today, Principle VI would certainly run afoul
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 1.4(b) requires a
lawyer to "explain a matter of the extent reasonably necessary to per-
mit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representa-
tion."' 25 In summary, the Guiding Principles are outdated and do not
offer reliable guidance.
California, again at the forefront of insurance litigation, has at-
tempted to legislate a solution to some of the problems arising out of
the tripartite relationship.' 2 6 Section 2860 of the California Civil
Code provides:
(a) If the provisions of a policy of insurance impose a duty to defend upon
an insurer and a conflict of interest arises which creates a duty on the part of
the insurer to provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer shall
provide independent counsel to the insured unless, at the time the insured is
informed that a possible conflict may arise or does exist, the insured expressly
waives, in writing, the right to independent counsel. An insurance contract
may contain a provision which sets forth the method of selecting that counsel
consistent with this section.
119. GUIDING PRINCn'LES, supra note 117, at 95-99.
120. See O'Malley, supra note 24, at 513.
121. See id.
122. 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Ct. App. 1984).
123. GUIDING PIINCEPLES, supra note 117, at 97-98.
124. O'Malley, supra, note 24, at 514.
125. MODEL RuLs OF PROFEssIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.4(b)(1983).
126. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 1993).
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(b) For purposes of this section, a conflict of interest does not exist as to
allegations or facts in the litigation for which the insurer denies coverage;
however, when an insurer reserves its rights on a given issue and the outcome
of that coverage issue can be controlled by counsel first retained by the insurer
for the defense of the claim, a conflict of interest may exist. No conflict of
interest shall be deemed to exist as to allegations of punitive damages or be
deemed to exist solely because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of
the insurance policy limits.
(c) When the insured has selected independent counsel to represent him or
her, the insurer may exercise its right to require that the counsel selected by
the insured possess certain minimum qualifications which may include that
the selected counsel have (1) at least five years of civil litigation practice
which includes substantial defense experience in the subject at issue in the
litigation, and (2) errors and omissions coverage. The insurer's obligations to
pay fees to the independent counsel selected by the insured is limited to the
rates which are actually paid by the insurer to attorneys retained by it in the
ordinary course of business in the defense of similar actions in the community
where the claim arose or is being defended. This subdivision does not invali-
date other different or additional policy provisions pertaining to attorney's
fees or providing for methods of settlement of disputes concerning those fees.
Any dispute concerning attorney's fees not resolved by these methods shall be
resolved by final and binding arbitration by a single neutral arbitrator se-
lected by the parties to the dispute.
(d) When independent counsel has been selected by the insured, it shall be
the duty of that counsel and the insured to disclose to the insurer all informa-
tion concerning the action except privileged materials relevant to coverage
disputes, and timely to inform and consult with the insurer on all matters
relating to the action. Any claim of privilege asserted is subject to in camera
review in the appropriate law and motion department of the superior court.
Any information disclosed by the insured or by independent counsel is not a
waiver of the privilege as to any other party.
(e) The insured may waive its right to select independent counsel by sign-
ing the following statement: "I have been advised and informed of my right to
select independent counsel to represent me in this lawsuit. I have considered
this matter fully and freely waive my right to select independent counsel at
this time. I authorize my insurer to select a defense attorney to represent me
in this lawsuit."
(f) Where the insured selected independent counsel pursuant to the provi-
sions of this section, both the counsel provided by the insurer and independent
counsel selected by the insured shall be allowed to participate in all aspects of
the litigation. Counsel shall cooperate fully in the exchange of information
that is consistent with each counsel's ethical and legal obligation to the in-
sured. Nothing in this section shall relieve the insured of his or her duty to
cooperate with the insurer under the terms of the insurance contract.1 2 7
The California statute was central to the court's decision in Blanchard
v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,128 among the latest cases reining
in Cumis.
Florida has also attempted to legislate a solution, albeit limited in
scope. 12 9 The Florida statute provides that in order to deny coverage,
127. Id.
128. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 884, 887 (Ct. App. 1991).
129. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.426(2)(West 1984).
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a liability insurer must first send a reservation of rights letter within
thirty days after it knew or should have known of a coverage de-
fense.-30 Then, within a limited period, the insurer must either refuse
a defense, obtain a nonwaiver agreement, or retain independent coun-
sel mutually agreeable to the parties.'13 The parties may agree on
reasonable fees to be paid independent counsel; if they are unable to
agree, fees will be set by the court.'32
VI. PROPOSED RESOLUTION OF CONFLICTS
Conflicts arising out of the tripartite relationship pose genuine
problems for insurance defense practitioners. The last several years
have seen a dramatic increase in legal malpractice suts;'3 3 the dual
client doctrine makes insurance defense counsel particularly suscepti-
ble to malpractice claims. Insurers face the constant threat of bad
faith litigation and the accompanying potential for extracontractual
damages. Across the table, insureds denied loyal and competent rep-
resentation are threatened with financial ruin.
Various scholars and commentators have suggested reforms.
While some have suggested revising the basic liability insurance con-
tract, most suggestions for reshaping the insurer-insured relationship
to minimize conflicts have been rejected as unworkable. There is no
provision that can be written into an insurance policy that can alter
defense counsel's ethical obligations or eliminate the conflicts that
arise when coverage is disputed.'3 4 Ronald E. Mallen, a preeminent
legal malpractice scholar, has suggested that insurers market defense
counsel.-35 Essentially, an insured should be given recommendations
regarding several defense attorneys approved by the insurer "rather
than an assignment as a fait accompli."'136 The insurer's fundamental
objective is demonstration to its insured that representation by ap-
pointed defense counsel is desirable. ALAS's Robert E. O'Malley pro-
130. Id. at (2)(a).
131. Id. at (2)(b).
132. Id.
133. Almost 40% of law firms responding to a survey indicated that legal malpractice
claims were made against them between 1990 and 1992. For those firms with 41
or more attorneys, nearly 60% had legal malpractice claims filed against them.
David A. Schaefer, Avoiding Malpractice Claims: Help Yourself Because Juries
Won't, 60 DESF. CouNs. J. 584, 584 (1993). Conflicts of interest may affect attor-
neys' malpractice exposure in two ways. First, conflicts may form the basis of a
malpractice action. Second, even if the gravamen of the plaintiff's complaint is
unrelated, a conflict of interest may taint the case and complicate the defense.
See Robert E. OMalley et al., Selected Conflicts of Interest Issues, Loss Preven-
tion Program (Attorneys' Liab. Assurance Soe'y, Inc., Bermuda), June 14, 1991,
at 42 (materials on file with the author).
134. See Mallen, supra note 5, at 120.
135. See id. at 122-23.
136. See id. at 124 (emphasis added).
1994]
292 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:265
poses a set of "Guiding Principles II."137 The "Guiding Principles H"
are advocated as a means of providing insureds with loyal and compe-
137. The Guiding Principles II have at their heart simplification of the dual client
doctrine. They are:
1. An environment that facilitates the detection and punishment of
insurance fraud is a fundamental objective.
2. As a general proposition, an insurance company is a client of its
designated defense counsel vis-a-vis the entire world of nondlients.
3. When a lawyer is assigned by the insurer to represent an insured,
that lawyer must consult with and obtain the consent of the in-
sured as specified in Model Rules 1.7(b) and 1.8(f). Such consulta-
tion with the insured shall include (i) an explanation of the
insurer's periodic reporting requirements, (ii) a discussion of the ex-
tent to which the insurance policy permits the insurer to settle
within policy limits without the consent of the insured, and (iii) de-
fense counsel's limited responsibility as described in principles 7
and 8 below.
4. The insured has the option to refuse consent and retain counsel of
the insured's choice at the insured's expense. In that event, these
principles as such are no longer applicable. It should, however, be
recognized by the insured and defense counsel that much of the
conduct prescribed for the insured and defense counsel in these
principles is also mandated by applicable law, legal ethics codes,
and the insurance policy's provisions.
5. Assuming the insured agrees to be represented by the insurer's des-
ignated defense counsel, for all purposes as to that particular mat-
ter the insured is the only client of that lawyer.
6. From the outset of any such matter referred to in principle 5 above,
whether or not there is any conflict or potential conflict between
insured and insurer, and regardless of whether or when any such
conflict or potential conflict is later identified, the insurance com-
pany is not for any purpose a client of defense counsel.
7. In the situations referred to in principles 5 and 6 above, the defense
counsel's duty as lawyer for the insured is restricted to:
a. defending the liability claim competently;
b. exercising independent professional judgment on behalf of the
insured as required by Model Rules 1.8(f) and 5.4(c);
c. advising the insured regarding the insured's contractual (and, if
necessary, extra-contractual) rights and obligations under the
policy (e.g., if the policy so provides, the insurer's right to settle
within policy limits without the insured's consent); and
d. within the limitations of defense counsel's general ethical obli-
gations (see principle 11, below), conducting the liability de-
fense so as to place the insured in the most favorable posture
with respect to any actual or potential coverage dispute, or
other dispute between insured and insurer.
8. Except as is otherwise implicit in principle 7 above, defense counsel
shall not represent or advise or otherwise be involved with either
the insured or the insurer with respect to any coverage dispute or
any other dispute between the insured and the insurer.
9. As the lawyer for the insured for the limited purposes described in
principle 7 above, defense counsel has no fiduciary duty to the in-
surer and has no duty to the insurer based on any concept of a law-
yer-client relationship, as to that particular matter.
10. Apart from defense counsel's general ethical obligations (see princi-
ple 11 below), defense counsel's obligation to the insurer is based
solely on defense counsel's role as agent for the insured. The obli-
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gation is no greater and no less than that of the insured under the
provisions of the insurance policy and generally applicable law.
11. As a matter of legal ethics, defense counsel has the same obliga-
tions to the insurer and to the plaintiff that would be owed in any
matter to any third party who is not a client. These obligations
include:
a. not lying,
b. not assisting a crime or fraud by the insured;
c. resigning if the insured is engaged in a crime or fraud;
d. not asserting a nonmeritorious claim; and
e. taking remedial action if the insured intends to commit, or has
committed, perjury.
12. If defense counsel has resigned pursuant to Model Rule 1.16(a)(1)
because the insured is attempting to perpetrate a crime or fraud,
defense counsel, pursuant to comments [15] and [16] under Model
Rule 1.6, shall give the insurer notice of defense counsel's with-
drawal, and following the resignation shall also "withdraw or disaf-
firm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the like7 previously
submitted by defense counsel to the insurer or to the court that con-
tains a material misrepresentation, omission or similar material
falsehood.
13. Except for the indirect disclosure that is inherent in the resignation
and document withdrawal scenario described in principle 12 above,
defense counsel may not inform the insurer of the insured's crime
or fraud. In general, defense counsel may not inform the insurer of
anything adverse to the insured vis-a-vis the insured's relationship
with the insurer, not even the potential (but unspecified) conflict of
interest. Under these principles, any dispute or potential dispute
between the insured and the insurer does not create a conflict of
interest problem for defense counsel because defense counsel's only
client is the insured. On the other hand, nothing contained in these
principles prohibits deferise counsel from disclosing to the insurer
negative information about the insured that bears materially on
the defense of the case, such as the credibility and impeachability of
the insured and the degree of culpability of the insured.
14. The nondisclosure rules contained in principle 13 above are subject
to any contrary explicit provisions of the ethics code in effect in any
given jurisdiction.
15. The insured, having originally consented to be represented by the
designated defense counsel within the framework of these princi-
ples, has no right at any time thereafter to demand representation
by a separate or additional counsel at the expense of the insurer,
except in the rare case where changed circumstances (not covered
by these principles) later created a serious conflict of interest on the
part of defense counsel that under general principles of legal ethics
is not waivable by the insured.
16. In any case where defense counsel has withdrawn from the repre-
sentation of the insured, or otherwise for any reason ceases to rep-
resent the insured, the insurer continues to have the right to
designate a successor defense counsel (who shall be subject to these
principles) to the same extent as that right existed under the policy
with respect to designation of the original defense counsel.
17. The insured may at any time and for any reason retain separate
counsel at his or her own expense to advise the insured as to any
and all aspects of the matter. In such an event, the designated de-
fense counsel shall, in good faith, consult with the insured's special
counsel with a view to achieving mutual agreement as to what
strategy and tactics are in the best interests of the insured.
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tent representation, protecting liability insurers' legitimate interests,
and eliminating the expense and other negatives associated with the
engagement of independent counsel for insureds.138 The "Guiding
Principles II" count as advantages their grounding in existing ethics
rules, and the fact that they neither contemplate nor require changes
in policy language or accepted industry practice. Finally, defense ex-
pense coverage and indemnification coverage might be separated, and
provided by different insurers. 139 Although the creation of defense ex-
pense insurance might present a variety of potential problems or dis-
advantages,1 4o it would eliminate most conflicts of interest and might
reduce potential bad faith actions against insurers.1 4 1
Regardless of option, "[t]he key to reform is a level playing field
with bright lines."14 2 Whether bright lines can, in fact, be drawn is an
open question; the eternal triangle of insurance defense is an area of
constant legal flux. Realizing that practical advice often complements
theoretical discussion, and wary of hard and fast rules or solutions,
the following discussion represents a modest attempt to craft some
broad professional guidelines. The goal, of course, is avoiding or miti-
gating conflicts of interest in practice.
First, defense counsel must treat the insured as the client. Recog-
nizing the insured as the attorney's sole client is consistent with re-
cent judicial decisions. 14 3 Appointed counsel's continuing business
relationship with the insurer must not be allowed to interfere with the
18. Notwithstanding the presence of separate counsel for the insured
as described in principal 17 above, the defense counsel and the in-
surer shall continue to control the defense to the extent contractu-
ally provided in the insurance policy.
19. In the case of any dispute or potential dispute between insured and
insurer, the insurer may be represented by its officers and employ-
ees in addition to counsel of its choice (other than defense counsel).
In such a case, the insured and defense counsel shall provide infor-
mation to the insurer in accordance with any contractual obliga-
tions flowing from the insurance policy and in accordance with
their obligations under the generally applicable law.
O'Malley, supra note 24, at 521-25.
138. See id. at 520.
139. See Alan I. Widiss, Abrogating the Right and Duty of Liability Insurers to Defend
Their Insureds: The Case for Separating the Obligation to Indemnify from the
Defense of Insureds, 51 OHIO STATE L.J. 917, 939 (1990).
140. Potential disadvantages include higher total premiums, increased defense costs,
complexity introduced by the involvement of an additional insurer, loss of the
liability insurer's expertise, fostering opportunities for the insured and counsel to
structure the third-party litigation so as to bring any judgment within the scope
of the coverage, and disputes between the insured and the indemnification carrier
with respect to litigation management or settlement. See id. at 940-42.
141. Id. at 942-45.
142. O'Malley, supra note 24, at 520.
143. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Pullman, Comley, Bradley & Reeves, 929 F.2d
103, 108 (2d Cir. 1991); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 751 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); First Am. Carriers, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 787 S.W.2d
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duties of confidentiality, disclosure, honesty, and loyalty owed the in-
sured. Perhaps the best practice is for defense counsel to write both
the insurer and insured when first engaged to explain or delineate
ethical duties under state law, including the nature or circumstances
of expected communications, the insured's right to select independent
counsel at its expense, and the conduct of settlement negotiations.
The insured should also be informed of the insurer's right to control
the defense. If the insurer does not do so in its initial letter to its
insured, defense counsel may also need to inform the insured about
coverage limits, whether the coverage limits are declining, and the in-
sured's duty to cooperate. Most insurers expect an acknowledgment
letter following a defense assignment, and they are also sensitive to
coverage issues and conflicts of interest. Carriers involve separate
coverage counsel as warranted. Including in an insurer's acknowledg-
ment letter the sort of information outlined above, and similarly com-
municating with the insured, should pose little business difficulty for
defense counsel.
At the same time, treating the insured as the client does not relieve
a defense attorney of certain obligations to the insurer. Basically, de-
fense counsel must strive to fulfill all of the insurer's claims-handling
requirements.'" Counsel must satisfy all reporting requirements,
timely inform the insurer of case developments, consult with claims
representatives regarding matters such as defense expenditures and
the engagement of expert witnesses, and involve the insurer in all set-
tlement matters. Defense counsel's reports should detail the case's
procedural status, highlight important factual developments, outline
defense strategy, analyze liability and damage potential, and indicate
settlement possibilities.145
Second, defense counsel must ascertain how to deal with confiden-
tial information under applicable state law. As a general rule, a de-
fense attorney should never share with the insurer confidential
information communicated by the insured. If defense counsel learns
of information suggesting coverage defenses, such information must
be kept confidential. Under no circumstances should appointed coun-
sel attempt to uncover or develop coverage defenses. Depending on
the facts and the jurisdiction, counsel may have to withdraw.
Third, defense counsel should exercise great caution if asked to
represent multiple insureds. At the outset, a defense attorney repre-
senting two or more insureds should analyze potential conflicts, dis-
close potential conflicts to each insured, and obtain valid waivers.
Counsel must closely monitor potential conflicts as the case pro-
669, 671 (Ark. 1990); Atlanta Intl Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 297-99 (Mich.
1991).
144. See Winiarski, supra note 30, at 599.
145. See id. at 600.
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gresses, because conflicts may develop to the point of requiring with-
drawal. Any attorney attempting multiple representation must
objectively determine that no client's interests will be impaired.
Finally, an insured should be consulted with respect to settlement
even when the proposed settlement is entirely within policy limits and
the policy reserves to the carrier exclusive control over settlement de-
cisions.146 This advice is particularly applicable to cases in which the
defendant is a professional.147 For example in Rogers v. Robson, Mas-
ters, Ryan, Brumund and Belom,14 8 the Illinois Supreme Court held
that defense counsel were obligated to disclose to the insured the in-
surer's intent to settle a malpractice case without his consent, and
contrary to his express instructions. 4 9 The attorneys' duty to make
such disclosure stemmed from their attorney-client relationship with
the insured, regardless of the insurer's broad contractual authority to
settle without its insured's consent.150 In Arana v. Koerner,153 the
Missouri Court of Appeals observed that defense counsel breached
their duty of "good faith and fidelity" to an insured by ignoring his
instructions to litigate, rather than settle, a malpractice suit.152
At a minimum, defense counsel must inform insureds of their in-
surers' intent to settle. The insureds may then assert whatever com-
mon law rights they may have.
VII. CONCLUSION
Insurance defense counsel are presented with a variety of ethical
dilemmas attributable to the unique tripartite relationship they share
with insurers and their insureds. Appointed counsel may encounter
conflicts of interest when they are first assigned the defense, during
discovery, while shaping litigation strategy, and in settlement negoti-
ations.' 5 3 When a conflict appears and the usually harmonious rela-
tionship between insurer and insured is disrupted, an "elaborate
minuet" ensues.' 54 As Robert E. O'Malley of the ALAS explains:
146. If an insured must ultimately pay a settlement as part of its deductible, the in-
sured must consent to settlement. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Edge
Memorial Hosp., 584 So. 2d 1316 (Ala. 1991).
147. "Some states have created what might be called a 'professional liability' exception
to the general rule granting the carrier exclusive control over settlement deci-
sions." Murray & Bringus, supra note 3, at 288.
148. 497 N.E.2d 47 (Ill. 1980).
149. See id. at 49.
150. Id. The Rogers holding has been roundly criticized. See, e.g., Mitchum v.
Hudgens, 533 So. 2d 194, 196-97 (Ala. 1988).
151. 735 S.W.2d 729 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
152. Id. at 733. But cf In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 1987)("[T]he
insurer may accept a settlement offer even though the insured wants to go to trial
to establish freedom from fault.").
153. Hall, supra note 8, at 762.
154. O'Malley, supra note 24, at 516.
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This dance is nerve-racking for defense counsel and often severely prejudicial
to the insured. The identification of a conflict, its disclosure, the ensuing dis-
cussions, and (in some cases) the resignation of the original defense counsel
have the effect of notifying the insurer that facts may exist that are prejudicial
to the insured. For example, there may be a coverage defense that the insurer
would not have become aware of without defense counsel's tacit notice. When
the conflict of interest issue arises and defense counsel resigns, the insurer is
alerted to the need for further investigation. Often, without any additional
disclosure by defense counsel, the insurer will discover the facts that are prej-
udicial to the insured.15 5
When the dance ends, defense counsel may find themselves subject to
malpractice claims by both insureds and insurers.15 6
The avoidance of conflicts of interest depends on early recognition.
If a defense is provided under a reservation of rights, counsel must
determine if the issue on which coverage hinges is within counsel's
control when defending the underlying claim. Might a potential con-
flict be avoided by full disclosure and the insured's consent to repre-
sentation? The resolution of conflicts depends on the facts of the
particular case and, in many instances, on the law of the forum state.
Certain principles transcend jurisdictional boundaries: defense coun-
sel must serve insureds loyally and with the fidelity afforded all other
clients; client confidences must be respected, communication obliga-
tions having been established in advance; the representation of multi-
ple insureds should be carefully scrutinized; and insureds and
insurers must be involved in settlement.
The tripartite relationship between insurer, insured, and insur-
ance defense counsel creates problems that "would tax Socrates, and
no decision or authority . . furnishes a completely satisfactory an-
swer."15 7 The best one can hope for is a greater understanding of this
dynamic area of law.
155. Id. at 516.
156. Many jurisdictions permit liability insurers to maintain malpractice actions
against defense counsel. See Glenn v. Fleming, 781 P.2d 1107 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989); Friesens v. Larson, 438 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev'd on other
grounds, 443 N.W.2d 830 (Minn. 1989); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Winslow, 382
S.E.2d 872 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989). Some states allow insurers to pursue defense
counsel under an equitable subrogation theory in the absence of an attorney-cli-
ent relationship. See, e.g., Atlanta Intl Ins. Co. v. Bell, 475 N.W.2d 294, 297-99
(Mich. 1991).
157. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So. 2d 255, 273 (Miss. 1988).
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